Tuesday, June 4, 2019

A Numerical Error in Hawking’s book, ”Brief answers to big questions”



A Numerical Error in Hawking’s book, ”Brief answers to big questions”

Last time I had an erratum of mine to share. This time: it’s somebody else’s!
On p.115 of Stephen Hawking’s book, “Brief answers to big questions” [1], it is written:

“The speed at which we can send a rocket is governed by two things, the speed of the exhaust and the fraction of its mass that the rocket loses as it accelerates. The exhaust speed of chemical rockets, like the ones we have used so far, is about three kilometres per second. By jettisoning 30 per cent of their mass, they can achieve a speed of about half a kilometre per second and then slow down again.” (emphasis mine).

This looks just like momentum conservation, so I tried to get the answer: ‘about ½ km/sec’. The only hassle is that the mass keeps changing as the fuel is expended and exhausted. So I wrote a simple BASIC program, but I got a different number: 1.07 km/sec. Then I realized you can get the same result by integration:
Vexh dm = m dV
Rearranging:
dV = - Vexh dm/m
Integration of the equation from V = Vi (initial velocity) & mass M = Mi at t = ti to V = Vf  & M = Mf at t = tf yields:
DV = - Vexh ln (Mi/Mf), where DV = Vf – Vi.
Assuming 30% of the fuel is used, as mentioned, and Vexh = 3 km/s, we get:
DV = - 3 ln(1/0.7) @ 1.07 km/s.

After I did all this I belatedly remembered that there was something called a rocket equation that was derived by Konstantin Tsiolkovsky in 1903 [2].

At this point I decided to write to the publisher of the book but I got no reply, mainly because I was not sure if it was published by Hodder & Stoughton, Hachette or whoever. I even mailed some website claiming to be  'connected with Lucy Hawking'. Finally I got a reply from an editor at John Murray, (to the mail to Hachette!), who thanked me for contacting them and said they would have to send it to an expert. After a reminder, about 45 days, the editor wrote that the expert felt that the writing ‘could be clearer’ and that they might just delete the passage since they were aiming at a non-specialist audience. (This sounds plausible, since the book was published in the memory of Stephen Hawking, who died in March 2018).
I wrote that they should just correct the error, and add a footnote crediting the rocket equation to Tsiolkovsky [2]. No reply, to date.
I then sent the question to the author F.Todd Baker [3] (at his website Ask the Physicist) - who agreed with the number that I had calculated. He also speculated as to why the discrepancy occurred:
 “I do not know how Hawking came up with his answer, but it might hinge on what he means by "30% of its fuel"; you and I have interpreted that to mean the exhausted fuel has a mass equal to 30% of the mass of the rocket before the fuel was burned, hence M/(M+m)=0.7.
Also, maybe he was thinking about a launch from earth which would require some of the energy from the rocket to overcome the gravitational force and the energy loss from air drag.
Or maybe he was guesstimating the effects of efficiency of the engines.”

My explanation is simpler: whoever did the calculation, used the rocket equation, but calculated log10 instead of ln. The factor of 2.303 accounts for the discrepancy, resulting in a number of 0.46 km/sec – which was then approximated as ‘about ½ km/sec’.

However, Baker made another point: that the above equation neglects the mass of the rocket itself (and the mass of the payload). So what are the numbers for the ‘dry mass’?
“For a typical rocket, the total mass of the vehicle might be distributed in the following way: Of the total mass, 90% is the propellants; 6% is the structure (tanks, engines, fins, etc.); and 4% can be the payload ” [4].
According to NASA [5], the percentage varies, depending upon the propellant used, but it varies between roughly 85-95% :

Propellant
Rocket Percent Propellant for Earth Orbit

Solid Rocket
96

Kerosene-Oxygen
94

Hypergols
93

Methane-Oxygen
90

Hydrogen-Oxygen
83


I found an easy way out: an online calculator from Wolfram [6]. (Probably Hawking’s assistant should have used it too!). The calculator requires that you input both the initial and final mass, but the DV calculated depends only on their ratio (as above). But I checked it independently as well, accounting separately for the rocket mass and the fuel in the equation for initial and final masses.
The results are tabulated below for ratios of (rocket mass)/(initial mass) varying from 0 to 15%. For the case of 30% fuel used, and zero rocket mass, the number 1.07 km/sec is obtained from the online calculator (see below). As expected, the DV decreases as the percentage of rocket mass increases – but not drastically. This takes care of F.Todd Baker’s suggestion (one of them, rather). The other point that he made: there is a difference between 30% of the initially available fuel being consumed vs 30% of the initial mass being burnt as fuel. For the case of low dry mass fractions (<15 a="" air="" application="" are="" as="" but="" can="" checked="" difference="" drag="" efficiency="" engine="" for="" gravitation="" here="" is="" it="" not="" o:p="" occam="" of="" others="" out.="" razor="" results="" rule="" s="" shown="" small.="" the="" them="" there="">

Rocket mass/initial mass
30% of fuel used
40% of fuel used
50% of fuel used
70% of fuel used
80% of fuel used
100% of fuel used
0
1.07
1.532
2.079
3.6119
4.8283


0.05
1.006
1.434
1.933
3.28
4.2813
8.987
0.1
0.9441
1.3388
1.794
2.9827
3.819

6.908
0.15
0.8831
1.246
1.66
2.7116
3.418
5.691

The tabulated data are plotted in a graphical form above. It is interesting that there seems to be greater deviation from linearity for a larger fraction of fuel use.

At the end of the day, the whole calculation is rather trivial – especially if you know that you should use Tsiolkovsky’s rocket equation [2] – and even more so if you use the online calculator [6] from Wolfram. Nevertheless, it is important to get the numbers right.

Addendum:

An interesting application of the rocket equation was done by Hippke [7] in a recent paper. He argues that – assuming intelligent life develops on a super-Earth (up to 10X of Earth’s mass ME), it would need to overcome the planet’s higher gravity and thus higher escape velocity Vesc (which is proportional to M1/2, where M is the mass of the planet). This becomes difficult as he explains:
 “Many rocky exoplanets are heavier and larger than the Earth, and have higher surface gravity.
This makes spaceflight on these worlds very challenging, because the required fuel mass for a given
payload is an exponential function of planetary surface gravity. We find that chemical rockets still
allow for escape velocities on Super-Earths up to 10X ME . More massive rocky worlds, if they exist, would require other means to leave the planet, such as nuclear propulsion.”
The mass ratio of the vehicle becomes:

Mi/Mf = exp(Vesc/Vth)

which translates to a mass ratio of ~26 on Earth, and~2,700 on the super-Earth planet Kepler-20b (9.7X ME). This does not make it impossible – just that a humongous amount of fuel would be needed to reach escape velocity of the super-Earth. Hippke gives some arguments about why super-Earths would be suitable for life (at least they have more surface area than Earth!), but the jury is out on that one.

References:
1  1.    “Brief Answers to Big Questions” Stephen Hawking (John Murray, 2018) p.114
7   7.     Michael Hippke,” Spaceflight from Super-Earths is difficult” arXiv 18th May 2018 arXiv: 1804.04727v2





Wednesday, May 8, 2019

Are India's EVMs reliable? Erratum!




Addendum/Erratum:
The logic used above to argue for the ‘population’ to be taken as the constituency may be wrong. To explain, first look at the table below, and then the corresponding plot, for 99% confidence level, for the required sample size S for different rigging fractions(calculated using the hypergeometric distribution):

N
Fr = 0.5%
Fr =1%
Fr=5%
Fr=25%
104
875
448
90
16
105
915
457
90
16
106
919
458
91
16
107
921
458
91
16




As seen before, in the plot by Shetty, as N increases, S saturates, and, in fact, is completely flat at the highest rigging fraction (25%) – the easiest case to detect rigging. At the lowest rigging fraction of 0.5%, the sample size is much larger, since it is more difficult to detect low-level rigging.
The question discussed earlier was whether the population should be restricted to the EVMs in the constituency or should contain all the EVMs in India.
I re-read Shetty’s paper and realized that he actually recommended that the population should be all the EVMs in each State (not constituency, as I thought) – and the number of EVMs tested should vary from State to State, being a larger fraction of the total number of EVMs in smaller States (since saturation does not occur for small N).
I argued earlier that the constituency level was the appropriate population to be considered because the rigging fraction would vary from one constituency to the next, being low or non-existent in safe constituencies and definitely occurring in closely-contested ones. However, it is easy to detect high level rigging – it requires very few EVMs to be tested. It is more difficult to detect low level rigging – it requires more than an order of magnitude EVMs to be tested. But since the SC has already recommended 5 EVMs per constituency, this amounts to about 2,715 EVMs which will assure even low-level (0.5%) rigging is detected with 99% confidence (see Table above, where only 920 are needed) – and will definitely detect high-level rigging (a point that Shetty also makes).
Shetty makes a different argument: he considers the work-load of testing n EVMs in a population vs the added work-load of testing N-n EVMs as well, if even one EVM out of n EVMs is found to be rigged. He argues that the population should not be considered as all the EVMs in India, because if even one EVM anywhere in India is found to be rigged, all EVMs all over India would have to be tested. As a compromise, trading off the two types of work-load (n & N-n), he argues that each State should be considered as an independent unit, so only one State would need all its VVPATs to be checked. However, the decision that if India is the unit, and any one EVM is found rigged, need not trigger the testing of all EVMs in India – it could be restricted to the State in which the rigging was detected. This point, is, however, debatable.

The conclusion seems to be that the number of EVMs being tested is, in terms of statistics, sufficient at the 99% level of confidence. If it can detect low-level rigging at 0.5% in some constituencies, it can manage both high-level rigging, and a situation where many constituencies are not rigged at all, while low-margin ones are rigged (non-uniform rigging case). That means that the Expert Committee report must have used similar logic (although the exact numbers have not been released) considering all the EVMs in India as the 'population' - which Shetty also believes was the Committee's approach.
However, as pointed out earlier, this assumes that the testing protocols are sufficient to detect all forms of rigging – and this remains an area of doubt.

2  2.       K.Ashok Vardhan Shetty “Winning Voter Confidence: Fixing India’s faulty VVPAT-based audit of EVMs“, The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, Policy Watch Paper No.7, 2018

Monday, May 6, 2019

Are India's Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) reliable?


Are India’s Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) Reliable?
“There are three kinds of lies: Lies, damned lies and statistics” – quote popularized by Mark Twain.
The issue of reliability of EVMs is discussed in two parts: (i) the statistics and (ii) the hacking.
(i)                  The Statistics:
India’s EVMs have been right in the middle of many controversies in recent times. This is only to be expected, since the election process is highly contested, at every single point. Supporters of EVMs point out that they are far less susceptible to tampering than paper ballots which are prone to booth capture and ballot stuffing. Our EVMs got additional support from the Indonesian experience with paper ballots in which thousands of election officials fell sick because of overwork, and two hundred and seventy, sadly, died.
Due to objections of opaqueness, in 2013 the EVMs came with an add-on: the voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT). In the current elections, the Election Commission (EC) said that in each constituency only one EVM would be randomly checked for whether it was working as expected. Many political parties protested that checking just one EVM per constituency was not enough, and that 50% of all EVMs should be checked. EC replied that this would require an additional 6 days to count the VVPATs. The matter was then referred to an Expert Committee to determine what proportion of EVMs needed to be checked in order to ensure a high degree of confidence in the vote. The EC claimed that the committee agreed with the one EVM per constituency policy, but ultimately the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that 5 EVMs per constituency should be acceptable. Unfortunately, the EC has not released the Committee report, maybe because it is sub judice with the SC.
There are, in addition, claims made that the EVMs can be hacked. This could be done in several ways: a) replacing the chip in the EVM b) wireless hacking c) software hacking. These can, in principle, be detected by random checking. Let us, first, look at the statistical arguments. Various people have given their opinions e.g. Prof.Atanu Das of ISI Kolkata [1] and IAS officer Shetty [2]. According to Das [1], there are about 1.8 million EVMs across 543 Lok Sabha constituencies.
Let us use the simplest back-of-envelope calculation, to get a feel for the numbers. Assume 1% of the EVMs are rigged. If we test an EVM at random, there is a 99% probability of missing the rigged EVM. If we test 2 EVMs, the probability of missing the rigging is (0.99)(0.99) = 0.99^2, which is lower, as expected. If we test 10 machines, the probability is 0.99^10 = 0.90. But suppose we test 500 EVMs, it is 0.99^500 = 0.006. That is the probability of detecting the rigging is 99.4%. Note that this is pretty much what the EC wants: to test one EVM in each constituency.
Prof. Das has given similar numbers, but assuming different proportions of rigging, and 95% confidence:
“Let us take four different possibilities of level of potential rigging into account at the constituency level: 25%, 10%, 5% and 0.5%. We assume an equal distribution of 1.8 million EVMs across 543 constituencies. Tallying 11, 29, 58 and 534 V-VPATs per constituency (correspondingly) would allow us to find a rigged EVM with 95% probability for each of these four scenarios.”
How did he get these numbers? One can do similar calculations as above and get:
1 – (0.75)^11 = 1- 0.042 = 0.958              
1 – (0.9)^29 = 1 – 0.047 = 0.953               
1 – (0.950^58 = 1 – 0.051 = 0.949
1 – (.995)^534 = 1 – 0.0688 = 0.931          
However, Prof. Das has given a different method of calculation, utilizing the hypergeometric distribution, which was also used by Shetty [2] and is explained in detail in the wiki page [3].
“In probability theory and statistics, the hypergeometric distribution is a discrete probability distribution that describes the probability of k {\displaystyle k}k k successes (random draws for which the object drawn has a specified feature) in {\displaystyle n}n draws, without replacement, from a finite population of size {\displaystyle N}NNN N that contains exactly {\displaystyle K}k objects with that feature, wherein each draw is either a success or a failure. In contrast, the binomial distribution describes the probability of {\displaystyle k}k successes in {\displaystyle n}n draws with replacement. “
The hypergeometric distribution applies when two conditions apply:
(i)                  The population falls into two mutually exclusive categories (e.g., pass/fail, rigged/not rigged).
(ii)                The probability of success changes with each draw (sampling without replacement), because each draw decreases the population.
A random variable X that is distributed hypergeometrically is X ~ Hy (N,K,n) has a probability mass function pX(k):

PX(k) = Pr(X = k) = [(CkK)/(CnN)] [(Cn-kN-K}]

Where N is the total population size,
n is the quantity drawn in each trial,
K is the number of successes,
k is the number of observed successes in the trials.
Assuming k = 0 = X means that rigging was not detected, and the above binomial expression simplifies to:
P(X = 0) = [(N-K)!/(N-K-n)!]/[(N!)/(N-n)!]
The calculations are done in accord with a contingency table for 25% rigging (K = 0.25N):
N = 3314 n =11 N-n = 3303;  N – K = 0.75N = 2485;   N – K - n = 2485 – 11 = 2474
N = 3314 is an average number of VVPATs per constituency (1,800,000/543). Similar calculations are done for the other 3 rigging fractions: K = 0.1N, 0.05N and 0.005N and sample numbers n=29,58, and 534, correspondingly, of Atanu Das [1].
Calculated by the hypergeometric distribution:
For 25% rigging:
P (X = 0) = (2485!/2474!)/(3314!/3303!) = 0.04186196    P = 1 – 0.04186196 = 0.95813804
For 10% rigging:
P (X = 0) = (2982!/2953!)/(3314!/3285!) = 0.04614367   P = 1 – 0.04614367 = 0.95385633
For 5% rigging:
P (X = 0) = (3148!/3090!)/(3314!/3256!) = 0.04938557    P = 1 – 0.04938557 = 0.95061443
For 0.5% rigging:
P (X = 0) = (3297!/2763!)/(3314!/2780!) = 0.04999229      P = 1 – 0.04999229 = 0.95000771
The most difficult case to detect is when only 0.5% of EVMs are rigged, and this requires a large number of EVMs (534) to be tested per constituency.
For low rigging this is not a small fraction of the total, but it is small for higher rigging levels:
K
N
n/N
25%
11
0.33%
10%
29
0.87%
5%
58
1.75%
0.5%
534
16.11%

 Prof.Biswas mentions [1]:
“The 2009-10 National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) survey on employment covered around 100,000 households and 460,000 persons. According to the 2011 census, there were 247 million households in the country. So the NSSO essentially covered just 0.19% of the Indian households. Yet nobody doubts the veracity of employment numbers given by the NSSO.”
The important point being made is that the households sampled must be a representative sample – but it need not be a large, or even a significant fraction of the total. However, that is not enough of an explanation. The reason was given by Prof.Debasis Kundu (IIT-Kanpur), who mentioned in an interview to Karan Thapar on Tiranga TV (I could not find this statement online, unfortunately) that this statistical property is actually a consequence of the central limit theorem (CLT).   According to Madhav Mishra’s [4] explanation of the CLT:  as the sample size increases, the distribution becomes more and more normal (regardless of what the original distribution looked like) and the spread of the distributions decreases.
This does apply to household consumer surveys and to NSSO surveys [4,5].
The website of Van Dessel [5] calculates the required sample size for a consumer survey for either 95% or 99% confidence, for a variable population, depending upon the desired margin of error (MOE).
Supposing that margin of error corresponds to the percentage of rigging, we can see that with 1.8 million EVMs, and 99% confidence, with a 1% MOE, the sample size needed is 16,436 EVMs, which is a bit less than 1% of all EVMs. Van Dessel points out that his calculation assumes a normal distribution.
The official committee (ISI) report, titled ‘Random Sampling For Testing of EVMs via VVPAT Slip Verification’, is divided into two parts. In the operational part of the report, an optimal sample size is suggested, which would have a two per cent margin of error and a 99.99 percent confidence level [5]. Specifically, the number mentioned for the confidence level is 99.99366%.
In a presentation made in Aug.2018 to the then CEC O.P.Rawat. ISI experts Karandikar and Bhatt suggested mandatory counting of VVPAT slips in a sample size of 479 randomly selected polling stations across the country should be enough for the EC to satisfy itself – with 99% confidence – regarding the integrity of the elections [6].
The exact number recommended by the ISI to EC was not revealed since the matter was sub judice [7], but note that:
P = 1 - (0.98)^479 = 0.9999373
Which is pretty close to 99.99366%.
However, it is pointed out by Unnikrishnan [8] that there are about 3,314 EVMs per constituency (assuming an equal number in each constituency), and that for 0.5% rigging we need 534 VVPATs to be checked per constituency.
 If we take the average as 3314, this works out as 534/3314 = 0.16, or about 16% of all VVPATs in each constituency. This point has also been addressed by Shetty [2], who suggests that the calculation has to be done separately for each constituency – and that is exactly what he has done.
That is, the calculation done by Prof.Biswas of ISI does not agree with that done by Karandikar & Bhatt (also of ISI)! K & B recommend 0.027% checking, while Biswas recommends a number orders of magnitude higher! How does one explain this discrepancy? Most likely, K&B have not considered the case of low-level rigging (0.5%) which would be difficult to detect. But even Shetty [2] agrees that low level rigging can have a significant impact on election results in closely-fought constituencies.
An interesting feature shows up in Van Dessel’s calculator (assuming a normal distribution) that was pointed out earlier: the required sample size increases as N increases, but beyond a certain population size N the required sample size does not increase, it saturates:
N                             MOE:
1%
3%
5%
100
100
95
88
1,000
944
649
400
10,000
6240
1,557
623
100,000
14,228
1,810
660
1,000,000
16,317
1,840
664
10,000,000
16,560
1,843
664
100,000,000
16,585
1,843
664
The Table above is for 99% confidence. For 95% confidence the required sample sizes are smaller.
This is probably what Prof.Debasis Kundu was referring to, as a consequence of the central limit theorem (CLT). Note that as the MOE is tightened, it takes longer to saturate, and the saturated value is clearly also higher.
A very similar result can be obtained by plotting the above hypergeometric distribution calculation for much larger populations of N:


Fig.1 above has been plotted for two rigging fractions 10% (with K = 29) and 0.5% (with K = 534), as done by Prof.Atanu Biswas [1,3] – but extrapolated to much higher values. The same tendency for 1 – P to saturate is observed as in Van Dessel’s data [5] tabulated above. These kinds of results, presumably, what Pof. Debasis Kundu is referring to as consequences of the central limit theorem. The calculation can also be done for the case N = 1,800,000 and K = 1,000 and it gives P(X = 0) = 0.0066. This is a sampling fraction (1/1,800 = 0.055%) very similar to what the Supreme Court finally recommended, and smaller than what is obtained above (16,436/1,800,000 = 0.91%) using Van Dessel’s online calculator [5].

Shetty [2] plots a similar saturation (Fig.2) in terms of the number of samples required as the population size increases, assuming a hypergeometric distribution.
The sampling fraction suggested by Prof.D.Kundu and the Expert Committee does not agree with Unnikrishnan [8] or with Shetty [2]. The critical point is this: should one treat each constituency separately as done by Unnikrishnan and Shetty with only 3,134 EVMs or does one take the whole lot (1,800,000 EVMs) in the entire country together? The results – in terms of the sampling fraction – are very different: 16% as calculated by Unnikrishnan [8,1] and <1 543="" a="" absolutely="" an="" any="" apparently="" argument="" as="" assumes="" being="" but="" central="" conceptual="" conclusive="" consequences.="" constituencies="" counter-intuitive="" course="" debasis="" difference:="" direction.="" do="" evm="" expert="" found="" has="" have="" i="" if="" in="" invokes="" is="" it="" just="" know.="" kundu="" leaning="" limit="" myself="" not="" o:p="" of="" one="" prof.="" randomly.="" rather="" real="" really="" s="" say="" saying="" selected="" tested="" that="" the="" theorem="" this="" to="" when="" world="" would="">

Since I could not figure it out I asked a statistician, Prof.Chandan Mukherjee (Ambedkar University), and he pointed out that I was implicitly assuming that all constituencies are identical. Not only that they have the same number of EVMs (which is itself wrong, as mentioned by Shetty [2]), but more importantly, that the level of rigging is the same in each. Whereas it is more likely that only some constituencies will be targeted, in which the results could go either way.
 Prof.Mukherjee’s argument would imply that the fraction recommended by Unnikrishnan [8] and by Shetty [2] is right and each constituency must be considered separately. That is, the number of EVMs currently mandated by the SC: 5 EVMs per constituency is grossly inadequate.
In other words, the EC should follow Shetty’s recommendations [2] rather than those of the Expert Committee.
(i)                  The Hacking:
The statistical analysis simply decides how many EVMs should be tested, assuming that we know how to detect a tampered EVM, no matter what method was used to hack it. This may not always be the case.
However, the techniques used for hacking remain to be discussed. Hari Prasad [9,10] claimed that several types of hacks are possible and he wrote a paper along with his collaborators in 2010. Mainly, two methods are used: a dishonest display is used to favour a particular candidate (by changing the hardware of the EVM) or the vote is stolen by manipulating the memory (by using a clip-on device to temporarily connect to the EVM). In the former case, the hack is implemented by wirelessly communicating with the pre-installed hardware inside the EVM, so it needs a small antenna, which, Prasad claims can be hidden behind the circuit board of the EVM.
This specific claim is disputed by an engineer Dhiraj Sinha [11] who argues that the smallest antenna that functions at GSM frequencies (800/1800 MHz range) will be roughly 1x2x0.5 cm3in size, and it will be even larger if lower frequencies are used (10X larger for 100 MHz) – impossible to hide. Sinha also argues that it costs ‘millions of dollars’ to design a chip and ‘hundreds of millions of dollars’ to actually implement it. Sinha’s arguments are good – but not bullet-proof. After all, do the checkers open up the EVM they are testing?
Amaldev [12] proposes a ‘sniffer’ hack which targets the 1.5 m long cable that connects the balloting unit (which the voter punches) to the control unit (that actually records the vote). This hack involves replacing the cable with another similar-looking cable and a small sniffer circuit. This hack needs the help of EC officials at the booth, and it is possible to beat it by inspecting the balloting unit to check if a sniffer circuit is attached to it.
Another vulnerability that has been pointed out [13] is that the EVM chip is made by Renesas (Japan) and Microchip (USA): the one-time programmable (OTP) microcontroller chip could be replaced abroad before being shipped to India.
Prof.Poorvi Vora [14] has discussed some of the precautions being taken by the EC:
a      a)      The EVM is a standalone unit, not connected to the internet or to any network, which makes hacking difficult. But, as pointed out, a sniffer circuit or an antenna could be used.
b     b)     Which EVM is allocated to which booth is done by randomization. However, the randomization software and the seed used for randomizing can be figured out by a hacker.
c     c) EC uses cryptography to avoid attacks. But the key used for encrypting can be figured out, or the data can be manipulated before encryption.
d    d) The EVMs are sealed before the candidate list is decided, so a hacker will find it difficult to fix a specific button to favour a given candidate – but there are ways to do this, it seems.
e    e)  A voter has about 6 seconds to view the VVPAT to verify if the vote has been correctly registered. But, Prof.P.Vora points out, the current protocol is that the vote gets registered anyway. The correct way would have been to allow the voter to decide if the vote is correct, before it is made final and recorded by the control unit.
In fact, former DGP Harekrishna Deka noted that his vote was wrong [15] but did not make a complaint because he was told that there was a fine and a 6 months jail sentence if he was proved wrong!  EC has argued that this rule has been introduced because a) otherwise they would be flooded with frivolous complaints, and b) each such complaint would need 20 minutes to investigate, which would hold up polling.

The fact that the chip is OTP is an advantage, because once it is fused, according to an Expert Committee Report: “it cannot be read, copied, altered or re-fed into the chip at all”. Let’s give Prasad the last word on that:
 “The point is, because of the masked code, nobody can say with certainty that there cannot be built-in vulnerabilities in the chip design,” said Prasad [9]. “Even if there is a vulnerability it will be impossible for the Election Commission to detect. So, how do you rule out that there cannot be another circuit designed within the chip?”
 J.T. D’Souza adds:” Because the OTP does not allow the code to be scrutinized, it is not possible to find out if there was a Trojan or other vulnerability” [9]. There could be code embedded within the EVM which only gets activated under specific circumstances (like one specified candidate or party losing, or in response to a particular sequence/pattern of votes cast), that would not be detectable by normal testing of the EVM.
Bottomline: India's EVMs are claimed to be foolproof. In principle, there is no such thing. In practice, the statistics being followed by EC at present - and even the 5 EVMs per constituency recommended by SC - seem to be inadequate. As far hacking methods go, there are many - and it would require extremely tight control by an independent, vigilant, open-minded and nimble body to prevent them all. Does the India's Election Commission really match these requirements?
  

2           2.       K.Ashok Vardhan Shetty “Winning Voter Confidence: Fixing India’s faulty VVPAT-based audit of EVMs“, The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, Policy Watch Paper No.7, 2018
4          4.      https://towardsdatascience.com/understanding-the-central-limit-theorem-642473c63ad8 Madhav Mishra 19th June 2018
5          5.       https://www.checkmarket.com/kb/calculate-optimal-sample-size-survey/      Van Dessel
6         6.       https://indianexpress.com/elections/election-commissions-vvpat-counting-passes-experts-test-5644443/             Ritika Chopra Indian Express 24th March 2019



1        10.   Hari K.Prasad “Security analysis of India’s Electronic Voting Machines” pdf document (29th Apr.2010) at http://IndiaEVM.org

1      11.   https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/an-expert-explains-hack-evms-defy-science-5552983/             Dhiraj Sinha 4th Feb.2019